Abstract. This paper discusses the security of the Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm (FEAL) against Linear Cryptanalysis. It has been confirmed that the entire subkeys used in FEAL-8 can be derived with 2 25 pairs of known plaintext and ciphertext with a success rate over 70% spending about 1 hour using a WS (SPARCstation 10 Model 30). This paper also evaluates the security of FEAL-N in comparison with that of the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Introduction
This paper analyzes the applicability of Linear Cryptanalysis to the Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm (FEAL) [MSS88] . The structure of FEAL is similar to DES, except, for example, the permutation and the S-Boxes in F-function of DES are replaced by byte rotation and addition operation which are suitable for software implementation, and these differences are interesting from the viewpoint of cryptanalysis. In the Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL, our main concerns in evaluating the security of FEAL considering the replacement of F-function and S-Boxes are: 1) how to find effective linear expressions, 2) an estimation of the success rate against the number of pairs of plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts, N , and the approximate probability, p , and 3) an estimation of the memory size and the processing amount of the attack.
Linear Cryptanalysis

Notations and Preliminaries
The modified FEAL and its modified F-function [MY92] are analyzed here. The S-Boxes, S 0 and S 1 , of FEAL are defined as S i (x, y) = ROL2(x + y + i (mod 256)), where ROL2 rotates its input two bits to the left.
We use the similar notations and defines the right most bit of each symbol as the 0-th bit, which is the lowest bit, as well as in the reference [M93-1]
Principle
Linear Cryptanalysis analyzes the probability that the following equation holds.
where i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i a , j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j b , k 1 , k 2 . . . , k c are fixed bit locations defined by the linear expression, (Γ P, Γ C, Γ K). The value of the right side of this equation depends only on the key values. We denote S[k 1 , k 2 . . . , k c ] by S simply. Two kinds of probability are defined in Linear Cryptanalysis: one is p = Prob P,K {E(P, K)(Γ C)⊕ P (Γ P ) = K(Γ K)}, and the other is the absolute value of probability different from a half, p = |p − 1/2|. Hereafter, p will be used as the probability of the linear expression (Γ P, Γ C, Γ K).
Implementation Techniques
Matsui proposed the following practical implementation, and captured the effective text bits among text information, P and C, which are essential to calculate Equation (2), and the effective key bits among key information, K 1 and K n , which are essential to calculate Equation (2). Hereafter, t and k denote the number of effective text bits and the number of effective key bits, respectively.
In the following procedure, we first count the text frequency on the effective text bits and then count the key frequency on the effective key bits.
Algorithm 1 (Counter Technique)
[Data Counting Phase]
Step 1: Prepare 2 t counters U i (0 ≤ i < 2 t ), where i corresponds to each value on the t effective text bits of Equation (2).
Step 2: For each plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext, compute the value 'i' of Step 1 and count up the counter U i by one.
[Key Counting Phase]
Step 3: Prepare 2 k counters T j (0 ≤ j < 2 k ), where j corresponds to each value on the k effective text bits of Equation (2).
Step 4: For each 'j' of Step 3, let T j be the sum of U i 's such that the left side of Equation (2), whose value can be uniquely determined by i and j, is equal to 0.
Step 5: Let T max be the maximal value and T min be the minimal value of all T i,j 's.
If |T max − N/2| > |T min − N/2|, then adopt the key candidate corresponding to T max and guess S = 0 when p > 1/2 or 1 when p < 1/2. If |T max − N/2| < |T min − N/2|, then adopt the key candidate corresponding to T min and guess S = 1 when p > 1/2 or 0 when p < 1/2.
[Exhaustive Search Phase]
Step 6: Derive the remaining key bits exhaustively.
The computational complexity of this procedure except Step 6 is O(N ) + O(2 t+k ). The number of counters, U i and T j , required by this procedure is 2 t +2 k .
3 Linear Approximation of FEAL
What are the Problems
The essential differences between DES and FEAL are the structure of S-Boxes and that of F-function. More exactly, S-Boxes of DES are defined in a nonmathematical way using tables. S-Boxes of FEAL are defined mathematically using modular addition calculation with two bits left rotation. So it seems easier to find some property of S-Boxes of FEAL than that of DES. On the other hand, the eight S-Boxes in F-function of DES act in parallel more independently than four S-Boxes in F-function of FEAL which act sequentially, where the byte rotation is built in instead of the permutation of DES. Thus, it seems easier to find some semi-global property of F-function of DES than that of FEAL. It is not clear how these differences influence Linear Cryptanalysis.
Linear Expressions of F-function
We get various linear expressions of S-Boxes approximating the addition operation with the bitwise consideration of carry propagation as was done in [CG91] .
always holds, since there is no carry at the least significant bit in the addition operation, and this gives 15 non-trivial linear expressions of F-function with probability of 1/2, which can be always extended to 3-round linear expressions. If j = 1, we can make many examples with probability of 1/4 ignoring the bit position of i. This gives many local linear expressions with probability of 1/4.
Here the concatenation rule of XOR and BRANCH operations inside the Ffunction is also applicable in the same way as that between F-functions described in Section ??.
Linear Expressions of Reduced Round FEAL
We developed the following search algorithm to find effective 7-round linear expressions, where (Γ Y 4−r , Γ X 4−r ) = (Γ Y 4+r , Γ X 4+r ) holds for r = 1, 2, 3.
Algorithm 2 (Search Algorithm of 7-Round Linear Expression)
Step 1: Set (Γ Y 4 , Γ X 4 ) = (0, 0).
Step 2: Select a linear expression, (Γ Y 2 , Γ X 2 ), of F-function whose probability is 1 2 .
Step 3: Search Γ Y 3 where (Γ Y 3 , Γ X 3 ) has the probability of 2 −2 , given Γ X 3 = Γ Y 2 .
Step 4: Search Γ X 2 where (Γ X 2 , Γ X 2 ) has the probability of greater than or equal to 2 −3 .
Step 5: Put (Γ Y 1 , Γ X 1 ) = (Γ Y 3 ⊕ Γ X 2 , Γ X 3 ⊕ Γ X 2 ). Check whether its probability is greater than or equal to 2 −4 exhaustively, if (Γ Y 3 , Γ X 3 ) activates the same S-Boxes of F-function as (Γ X 2 , Γ X 2 ).
We have found the following eight pairs (Γ X 2 , Γ X 2 ) using the above algorithm and sixteen 7-round linear expressions with probability of greater than 2 −9 . This is one of examples with probability of 1.764 × 2 −9 , which is effective in our implementation described in Section 5. Γ X 2 Γ X 2 00000100 10105050 00000100 18185858 00000100 10107878 00000100 18187070 01000000 50101010 01000000 58181818 01000000 70101818 01000000 78181010 r ΓY r Γ X r p r P 1D000400 50101010 1 1D000400 54111010 85 × 2 C 1D000400 50101010
Note that the middle 5-round part of the above expression also has the probability of 1/8, while Biham described a 5-round linear expression with probability of 1/32 in [B94] .
Attack Strategy
We will discuss the attack strategy against FEAL-8 in this section: that is, 1) which is a better technique, 2-Round Elimination or 1-Round Elimination, and 2) which is the better expression for the 7-round case, Biham's or ours, as estimated from the memory size and processing amount.
Since the approximate probability of a linear expression for 6-round is larger than that for 7-round and N = c × p −2 holds, the 2-Round Elimination strategy is better than 1-Round Elimination from the standpoint of the required number of pairs for attack. However, 2-Round Elimination is infeasible, since the number of effective text bits, t, and the number of effective key bits, k, satisfy t, k = 24 ∼ 30 roughly, and the processing amount is O(2 42∼48 ) in 2-Round Elimination where we assume N = 2 18 . Let us estimate t and k for Biham's linear expression and those for our expression for 7-round, assuming the 1-Round Elimination Technique. An attack using our linear expression requires more running time than that using Biham's, since t, k = 20 ∼ 24 holds roughly, and the processing amount is O(2 36∼40 ). An attack of 1-Round Elimination using Biham's 7-round expression is practical, since t, k = 12 ∼ 15 and N = c × 2 22 holds, and the processing amount of Algorithm 1 is O(2 24∼30 ). The number of counters, U i and T j , required by Algorithm 1 is 2 12∼15 , which is acceptable. We decided to adopt the 1-Round Elimination Technique using Biham's linear expression for the first phase of an attack against FEAL-8, that requires us to analyze the following equation:
Our linear expression is effective for the later phases of an attack to derive subkeys other than those derived from the above equation.
Comparison with DES
The best expression can be obtained by an exhaustive search algorithm against DES [M93-1, M94-2]. It is an interesting fact that the number of active SBoxes, which are approximated with a certain masking value, at each round of F-function is at most one in the best expression of 16-round DES. Since the bit length of data input to each S-Box is 6, the number of effective key bits is 12 in Equation (2).
On the other hand, since the number of active S-Boxes of Equation (2) against FEAL is four if the Biham's linear expression is used, and the byte rotation is built in implicitly between S-Boxes, the number of effective key bits and effective text bits seems to be 24 ∼ 30, which is larger than is true with DES. Thus 2-Round Elimination is infeasible in FEAL, which it is efficient in DES. Unfortunately, since we don't have any practical search algorithm to obtain the best expression of FEAL, there might be a better linear expression than Biham's.
How about the effective key and text bits? The closer from the right side an input bit is to a bit position related to a reference point output by the eighth Ffunction, the more strongly the value of the input bit determines the value of the XOR operation performed on the reference points, F 8 (C H ⊕C L , K 8 ) [23, 25, 31] in Equation (2). Therefore, the effective key bits should be subdivided into explored key bits and detected key bits for an attack against FEAL. Note that since each key bit input to an S-Box of DES influences all output bits more equally than that of FEAL, detected key bits are identical to explored key bits in DES. As a result, the treatment of effective key bits is simpler in an attack against DES than against FEAL. The similar discussion is valid in the treatment of effective text bits, which provides the number of counter U i . Thus there are various strategies to reduce the number of effective (explored/detected) key/text bits in an attack against FEAL.
Concerning the parameter, N, of FEAL-N, where N means the iteration number of F-function, it seems that while FEAL-32 is as secure as DES against Differential Cryptanalysis, FEAL-16 is as secure as DES from the standpoint of Linear Cryptanalysis, since the number of key bits which are explored by the attack is 12 with the 14-round linear expression with probability of 1.192 × 2 −21 in DES, while it is 12 ∼ 15 with the 15-round linear expression with probability of 2 −23 in FEAL assuming the Biham's iterative 4-round expression is applied to the 15-round case.
Experimentation Results
The following information was described in [OA94] (1) A table relating the success rate, the number of pairs, and the effective (explored/ detected) key bits needed to solve Equation (3) using the 1-Round Elimination Technique. (2) How to derive the remaining values of all subkeys . (3) How to improve the success rate.
Note that there might also be more efficient strategy than ours to decrease the number of effective text and key bits.
Concluding Remarks
It has been confirmed that the entire subkeys used in FEAL-8 can be derived from 2 25 known plaintexts with a success rate over 70% spending about 1 hour, from 2 26 known plaintexts with a success rate about 100% spending a little over 1 hour using a WS (SPARCstation 10 Model 30).
It seems that while FEAL-32 is as secure as DES against Differential Cryptanalysis, FEAL-16 is as secure as DES from the standpoint of Linear Cryptanalysis if we restrict ourselves to Matsui's implementation technique using Biham's linear expression. There are several open problems: (1) Search algorithm to obtain the best expression of FEAL, (2) More efficient technique than Algorithm 1, and (3) More efficient strategy for reducing the numbers of effective text bits and effective key bits in an attack against FEAL-8.
